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INTRODUCTION

HERE are a number of instances in which a federal court asas
serts personal jurisdiction by service of process beyond the
territorial limits of the state in which it sits. The most common
examples of these assertions of jurisdiction are the use of a state's
long-arm statute l and the "bulge" provision of the federal rules.:!
But, in addition, there are a number of statutes by which Con-

T

• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B ..
Colgate University, 1968; J.D., Boston College, 1971.
I. FED. R. ClV. P. 4(e); e.g., United States Y. First Nat'l City Bank. 379 U.S.
378,381 (1965).
2. FED. R. ClV. P. 4(£). See il/fra text accompanying' notes 21-29.
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gress has authorized nationwide service of process in particular
circumstances. ;3
It is generally accepted that Congress may authorize expan
expansion of a federal district court's jurisdiction beyond the territorial
exlimits of the states in which it sits, including authorization of ex
traterritorial service ofprocess. 4 However, a question which must
be considered is whether there are any constitutional limitations
on this congressional power and, if so, what those limitations are.
For absent any restrictions, defendants could find themselves
placed in the difficult position of having to litigate a case in a disdis
trict far from home, with which they have no connection.
gov
This article will begin by examining the principles which govern the assertion of personal jurisdiction in federal court. It will
analyze examples of situations in which nationwide service of propro
para
cess has been authorized for the purpose of establishing the paradigm by which such authorizations are justified and limited.
Finally, this article will suggesl that the prevailing paradigm is inin
prob
adequate and it will offer an alternative for dealing with this problem in the future.
II.

SERVICE OF PROCESS IN FEDERAL COURT

A.

Personal jurisdiction in Federal Courts

In order for a federal court to assert personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, it must have power to do so. The defendant
must be amenable to service under a statute or rule of court
which authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and that assertion of
jurisdiction must be consistent with the due process clause of the
exer
fifth amendment. 5 Beyond this, service of process must be exercised in a manner both consistent with the authorizing provision
pro
3. For a reference to statutes authorizing such nationwide service of process, see illfra note 30.
4. E.g.. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree. 326 U.S. 438 (l9-l6):
Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 (1925); Peterfi'eund, FI'{/fml
jurisdirtioll alld Pmrtire, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 491, 499 n.65 (1957).
5. E.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. -l0-l. -l09
(1987); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,221 (1977) (Brennan,].. concurring' in
part and dissenting in part); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511.
514 (5th Cir. 1982); Edward]. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co ..
pos
289 F. Supp. 38 I. 390 (S.D. Ohio, 19(7). Oil/IIi Capital does lea\'e open the possibility of a common law service provision. For more detail 011 this point, see
illfra note 17. While most personal jurisdiction cases revolve around state coun
jurisdiction and are restrict.ed by the fourteenth amendment, it is the fi.fth
amendment which places due process limits on the COllrts of the federal go\'erngo\'ern
ment. E.g.. Mariash v. MorriH, 496 F.2d 1138. 1143 (2d Cir. 1974).
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and reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the action.o
The authority of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant was historically limited as a general rule to persons
Lafound or living in the judicial district. 7 In Robertson v. Railroad La
bor Board H the Supreme Court stated that Congress had the power
to authorize the process of federal courts to run throughout the
United StatesY The Court went on to rule that such authorizaauthoriza
tion had not been given in that case, which was a suit under the
Transportation Act of 1920. As such, "the general rule [that] the
jurisdiction of a district court in personam [was] limited to the disdis
trict of which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he can be
found" was to govern the outcome. IO
This concept of the limits of service has been broadened by
the adoption of rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The primary function of rule 4 is to set forth the appropriate
manner of service of process in federal courts. I I It expands on
the Robertson rule by stating in subsection (f) that the basic reach
loof federal process covers the entire state in which the court is lo
cated when two or more judicial districts are located therein. 12
accom
Beyond this, rule 4(f) makes clear that service may be accomplished beyond the territorial limits of the state in which the disdis
trict court sits if it is authorized by a federal statute or by the
rules. 13 This provision must be read in conjunction with rule
6. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838); Foster, LOlIg-.-lnll
jurisdiction ill Federal Courts, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 9, 16 (1969). This was the situa
situaFostion prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Fos
ter, supra, at 16.
8. 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
9. !d. at 622 (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569,604 (1878)). This congrescongres
secsional power arises out of its general supervisory authority under article III, sec
tion 1 of the United States Constitution. United States v. Union Pac. R.R .. 98
U.S. 569,602 (1878).
10. Rouertsoll, 268 U.S. at 627. In Oil/IIi CapitaIIlltemationalT'. Rudolf Wolff &
subCo. the Supreme Court questioned whether Robertson has been undercut by sub
Havsequent decisions which have moved away from principles of territoriality. Hav
ing raised the question, however, it then stated that it expressed "no view as to
the continued validity of Robertsoll S rationales." 108 S. Ct. 404, 412 n.1 0 (1987).
II. 2J. MOORE,J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, l\'IOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC
PRACTICE ~I 4.02[1], [21 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE].
12. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). The
relevant part of FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) is set forth iI/1m in the text accompanying
note 21.
13. A detailed explanation of the relation of rules 4(e) and 4(f) is sct forth
in 2 J. MOORt:, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.3212]
(2d cd. 1986) Ihereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
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4(e), which deals with extraterritorial service of process and propro
ser
vides that, in the absence of a federal statute, extraterritorial ser14
vice may be accomplished as provided by the rules. The second
sentence of the rule incorporates by reference the state court
alterna
practice of the state in which the district court sits as an alternative means of service.
One other provision of rule 4(f) is relevant to this discussion.
The second sentence of that section effectively provides for the
expansion of jurisdiction in the appropriate circumstances by a
lo
100 mile "bulge" from the place at which the courthouse is located, even though service may thereby be effected beyond the
state's boundaries, as long as it is within the United States. 15
In summary, rule 4 effectively states that a district court may
assert jurisdiction over any party within the state in which it sits,
author
and beyond the state's territorial boundaries if service is authorized by state law, a special federal statute or the 100 mile "bulge"
provISIOn.
While courts have traditionally stated that rule 4 attempts to
14. FED. R. elv. P. 4(e) provides:
thereun
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state in which the district court is held, service may be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or,
if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a
manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the
sum
state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or
notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason
lo
of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
This rule was read in conjunction with former FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) which apap
peared to be primarily concerned with use of state law for serving defendants
who were inhabitants of or found within the state in which the district court sat.
4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1114, at 241COI/42 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; Foster,Judicial E(OI/omy; Fairlless al/d COI/
venience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 94
n.63 (1968). However, there was apparently no intention to draw a sharp line
between the two rules, but rather they were intended to overlap. WRIGHT. supm.
at 243; Kaplan, Amendments of the Fedeml Rules of Civil Proadure. 1961-1963 (1), 77
HARV. L. REV. 60 I, 619-22 (1964); The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure eliminated rule 4(d)(7), and incorporated its substance into
rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supm note 13, ~ 4.08[31. The
new rule should be interpreted in the same way as its predecessor. /d.
15. E.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412. 416 (5th Cir. 1979)
juris
("[T]he I 00 mile bulge provision has effectively expanded the territorial jurisdiction of a federal district court beyond state lines .... "). For a discussion of
the policy underlying the "bulge" provision, see il/fra note 22.
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do no more than set forth the appropriate manner of service of
process,IG it is clear that it goes further. It incorporates federal
and state standards authorizing assertions of jurisdiction: that is,
not merely how service is accomplished but whether a defendant
throughis amenable to suit. In addition, by providing for service through
out the state and within the 100 mile "bulge," it is authorizing,
without other reference, some assertions of jurisdiction.
While typical questions of jurisdiction relate to whether the
disdefendant has sufficient connection with the state where the dis
trict court sits to warrant service,17 this is not always the case.
Two exceptions to this generalization are the "bulge" provision
included in rule 4(f) 18 and those federal statutes which authorize
nationwide service of process. 19 In these situations, the territorial
limits of effective service are expanded beyond the boundaries of
the state in which the district court sits. As numerous authorities
have pointed out, the fifth amendment due process clause pro
provides the applicable constitutional standard in reviewing these as
assertions of jurisdiction since we are concerned with the federal
16. E.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir.), mt.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966). There is a minority view, however, which sees Rule
4 as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. Berger, Acquiring in Personam jurisdiction ill
Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure -I,
1982 UTAH L. REV. 285, 288-93; Foster, supra note 7, at 16-17 n.28.
17. The several types of cases which can be brought in federal court usually
require this sort of "sufficient connection." In diversity cases it is generally ac
acdecepted that state law governs and the federal court must determine if the de
fendant is amenable to suit under state law, and whether that is consistent with
due process. Arrowsmith v. United Press InCl, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
ContraJaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); Green,
Federal jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 V AND. L. REV. 967
(1961). In a federal question case, the federal court may only assert jurisdiction
to the same extent as a state court, if pursuant to the second sentence of rule
4(e), it makes use of the state's long-arm statute because of the absence of a
federal statute providing for service. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
108 S. Ct. 404, 409-11 (1987); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260,
1264-69 (5th Cir. 1983); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514long17 (5th Cir. 1982). In Omni Capital the requirements of the applicable state long
arm statute were not met, and it was suggested that the federal courts develop
their own rule to authorize service. The Supreme Court refused to decide
whether it could "fashion a rule authorizing service of process," because it felt
that even if it had such power, it was not prepared to exercise it in the case
before it. This was because it had always been assumed that statutory authoriza
authorization was necessary, and it was not prepared to go beyond this assumption since
it felt that Congress was in a better position to structure service rules, and that it
Conwould be appropriate to show "circumspection ... in going beyond what Con
gress had authorized." 108 S. Ct. at 411-13.
18. For a discussion of the "bulge" provision, see infra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 16, at 318-19 n.157.
19. For a general reference to statutes authorizing nationwide service of
process, see infra note 30.
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government's power to require a defendant to appear. 20 The
question is what is the appropriate limiting standard under the
fifth amendment. To fully analyze this question it is necessary to
consider examples of such assertions of jurisdiction, the reasons
for them and the congressional authority to allow them.
B.

1.

Amenability Without Reference to State Boundaries

Rule 4(j)-The "Bulge" Service Provision

Rule 4(f) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[P]ersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule
14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a
counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19,
may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6)
of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the
state but within the United States that are not more than
100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced.
21
The purpose behind this provIsIon, according to the advisory
committee, was "to promote the objective of enabling the court
to determine entire controversies" by expanding personal jurisjuris
22
diction over a limited class of additional parties. Implicit in the
advisory committee's understanding of the rule is a concern over
whether this purpose is a sufficient justification for extending juju
risdiction beyond the boundaries of the state in which the district
court is sitting based solely on the party's connection with the
lawsuit, irrespective of the quality of contacts with the forum. Be20. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd 01/ other
groullds sub 110m., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Engineering' Equip. Co.
v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Foster, supra note 7, at 31;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 2 comment b (1969); RESTATERESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f (1980).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). The provision was added by an amendment to the
rule in 1963. MOORE, supra note II, ~ 4.42[2.-3]. It was amended to its present
form in 1966. Id. at ~ 4.01[26].
subdi
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment subdivision (f) [hereinafter Committee's Note]. As the advisory committee pointed
out, this provision'S primary value is "in metropolitan areas spanning more than
one State." [d. Courts have generally agreed that the rule provides for both the
manner of service of process and the amenability of the party to service. The
only limitation imposed is that the party served must have minimum contacts
either with the "bulge," e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 415-17
(5th Cir. 1979), or the entire state in which service is accomplished. E.g., ColeCole
man v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251-53 (2d Cir.
1968); MOORE, supra note II, ~ 4.42[2.-3] at 4-402 n.22.
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yond this the committee had to consider whether the Supreme
Court could authorize such an expansion of jurisdiction.
Regarding the appropriateness of such a rule, the committee
indicated that it would operate in only a limited number of situasitua
2
tions. :l In addition, the increased territorial range would not be
a hardship to parties in light of modern systems of communicacommunica
tions and travel,24 Regarding the Supreme Court's power to auau
thorize such a provision, the committee simply cited Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree. 25
In Murphree the United States Supreme Court rendered an
opinion which is invariably cited for the proposition that congrescongres
sional authorization of jurisdiction is not limited by state boundabounda
2G
ries.
In this case a resident of the northern district of
Mississippi filed a suit for libel in the district court against a DelaDela
ware corporation. The defendant had an office in the southern
district of Mississippi and had consented to suit in Mississippi.
The libel was published in the southern district. In the context of
discussing a number of objections raised by the defendant, the
Court considered the significance of its consent. It pointed out
that such consent rendered the defendant "present" in the state
and thus subject to service under the provision of rule 4 which
authorized service throughout the state and not simply in the disdis
trict. In this context, the Court asserted that "Congress could
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States."27
Since Congress had this power, although it had not exercised it
statutorily, the Court believed that it could effectuate such service
through its rulemaking power. 28 Thus the opinion both confirms
the power of Congress to authorize personal jurisdiction without
reference to state boundaries, and the Court's authority to exerexer
2
cise such service through its rulemaking power. !l
23. Commitlee's Note, supra note 22.
24. !d.; Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the TelTitorial Reach of Federal
Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 535 (1963).
25. Commitlee's Note, supra note 22 (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946)).
26. E.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979): SPf
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Supporting Memorandum B 437 (1969) [hereinaf[hereinaf
ter ALI STUDY]'
27. 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 PeL)
300, 328 (1838); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878);
Robertson, 268 U.S. at 622).
28. Id. at 442-43. See supra note 9.
29. 326 U.S. at 442-43; ALI STUDY, supra note 26, at 441; WRIGHT, supra
note 14, § 1127. The opinion went on to make clear that it was permissible for

HeinOnline -- 33 Vill. L. Rev. 7 1988

8

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 1

This analysis disposes of the concerns of the advisory com
committee concerning the bulge provision, and, in addition, serves as
a basis for the principle that Congress has the power to authorize
nationwide service of process. However, it avoids any direct com
comment on the question of whether there are due process limitations
on these authorizations of service of process. The reason for this
may simply be that there is no real problem with due process in
the "bulge" service situation. Murphree makes it clear that there is
no legitimate basis for saying that a federal court's territorial
Conreach is necessarily limited by state borderlines, and that Con
gress has the power to authorize service of process across state
lines. If this is so, then it can be argued that expanding a district
by 100 miles from the courthouse, as the advisory committee sugsug
gests, is not onerous or unreasonable and therefore not violative
inof personal due process rights. But to conclude that a slight in
crease in the reach of federal jurisdiction beyond state borders is
valid does not resolve the question whether (and to what extent)
limitations can or should be placed on more expansive assertions
of jurisdiction such as nationwide service of process. In consider
considering this question it is necessary to examine how the courts have
dealt with situations in which Congress has authorized jurisdic
jurisdiction far beyond the limits of the 100 mile bulge.
2.

Congressional Authorization of Nationwide Service of Process

Congress has exercised its power to provide for nationwide
service of process in a number of areas. 30 Typical examples of
this type of legislation are the jurisdictional provisions of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,31 the Federal Interpleader
Act,32 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 33 An examinaexamina
tion of the purposes of these provisions, and how the courts have
the rules to be used to implement this federal power in the absence of explicit
action by Congress. In the view of the court this neither violated FED. R. CIV. P.
82 nor the Enabling Act. The court stated that rule 82 had to be construed with
rule 4(f) since the advisory committee had drafted both. As such the court saw
rule 82 as referring only to venue and subject matter jurisdiction. The Enabling
manAct was not violated since the court viewed the rules as only affecting the man
ner and means of recovery, but not substantive rights. 326 U.S. at 445-46.
30. For a listing .of statutes authorizing nationwide service of process, see
MOORE, supra note II, ~~ 4.33 & 4.42[2.-1]; Berger, supra note 16, at 318-19
n.157.
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1982).
32. !d. §§ 1335, 1397,2361.
33. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-78KK (1982).
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ap
treated them, will be of assistance in formulating a general approach to nationwide service of process.
a.

Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962

Two major cases 34 have fully considered situations in which
jurisdiction was obtained by nationwide service of process under
the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.35 The relevant section
provides:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof actact
ing in his official capacity or under color of legal author
authority, or any agency of the United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial
district in which: (1) a defendant in the action resides, or
(2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property inin
volved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides
ifno real property is involved in the action.
The summons and complaint in such action shall be
served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and com
complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules
limmay be made by certified mail beyond the territorial lim
its of the district in which the action is brought. 3G
The section has been described as a "plaintiff's provision"
34. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd all olher g1'Oullds sub
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382
(D.R.I. 1977), aif'd ill pari and rev'd in pari, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rel"d all
olher groullds sub 110m., Stafford v. Briggs. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1982). It appears that the nationwide ser
service of process provision set forth in this section is intended to confer personal
al
jurisdiction and is not simply a method of service applicable to a defendant already amenable to suit. E.g., United States ex rei. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F.
Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). COlilm United States ex reI. Rudick v. Laird, 412
F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), mi. dellied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969). Rudick would seem to be
underqIt by the dictum in the later Second Circuit opinion of Liberation News
Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 (2d Cir. 1970).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982). The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
also added 28 U.S.C. § 1361 which enlarg'ed the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal district courts by specifically authorizing mandamus actions to require
government officials to perform their duties. By "historic (sic) accident" such
proceedings had previously been limited to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, rejJl'ililed ill
1962 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2784, 2785; see Stafford y. Briggs, 44-1
U.S. 527, 533-35 (1980); Byse & Fiocca, Serlioll 1361 of Ihe J/alld(l/IIUS alld 1 flllll'
Acl of 1962 alld "Xollslalulory" jlldirial Review of Ff'deml Admillislmlil'e .1rlioll. 81
HARv. L. REV. 308. 310-13 (1967).
110m.,
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which is intended to allow suits against supervisory federal offi
officials or heads of agencies in places other than the District of CoCo
37
lumbia, where they usually have their official residences. It also
is intended to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff wished or
was required to sue two indispensable federal officers in her
home state, but only one resided there. 38 It accomplishes these
purposes by expanding the possible bases for proper venue and
allowing service of process by certified mail beyond the territorial
limits of the state in which the court is located. 39
In considering these provisions, Congress made only passing
reference to the service of process provision. 40 Its primary focus
was to provide a local forum for resolution of such disputes. 41
While it has been generally accepted that the section provides for
nationwide service of process, it has been left to the courts to concon
sider whether there are any constitutional limits on this congres
congressional authorization.
proseIn Briggs v. Goodwin 42 the plaintiffs sued three federal prose
cutors and an FBI agent who had allegedly violated their constituconstitu
tional rights during a grand jury investigation in the northern
district of Florida. The suit was filed in the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia, which was the official residence of
one of the defendants. 43 The three Florida defendants were
served by certified mail. These defendants moved for transfer to
37. See, e.g., Powelton Civic Home Onwers Ass'n v. Department of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
38. See Jacoby, The Effeci of Recenl Changes in Ihe Law of "Nonslallllol)' "JlIdicial
Review, 53 GEO. LJ. 19,41 (1964).
39. Id.; MOORE, sllpra note II, ~ 4.29, at 4-242 to -245. Presumably the
second federal officer, as an indispensable party, could be served under the 100
mile bulge provision of rule 4(f), but this is of limited utility since frequently the
absent federal officer is located in the District of Columbia. It should be noted
that the "bulge" provision was adopted in 1963, so that it did not exist at the
time of adoption of section 1391 (e). Of course, it would also be possible to use
the state's long-arm statute, but in 1962 the general venue statute required that
the suit be brought where all the defendants resided and not where the claim
arose. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D.R.I. 1977), aif'd in part a/ld m,'d i/l
pari, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd all olher gTollnds sllb /10111., Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
40. H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
41. !d. at 2-3.
42. 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd all olher graullds SIIb /10111., Stafford y.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
43. The District of Columbia defendant was served within the district and
did not contest jurisdiction. Id. at 3 n.ll. Both the district court and court of
appeals denied this defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of absolute
prosccutorial immunity. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974),
aif'd, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), wi. dellied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
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the northern district of Florida or, alternatively, for dismissal for
improper venue and insufficiency of process.
In reversing the district court's order of dismissal, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia began its analysis by
pro
pointing out that section 1391 (e) was controlling, and that it provided that the district where one of the defendants resided was a
extraterrito
proper venue. 44 The court then considered whether extraterritoconstitu
rial service, as provided by the statute, presented any constitutional problems. The defendants argued that service was
improper because Congress did not intend nationwide service to
offi
apply in a personal action for money damages against federal officials. They argued alternatively that if it did apply, then such serser
45
vice was constitutionally deficient.
The court quickly disposed of the first argument by relying
on the categorical language of the section which did not provide
for any exceptions. 46
The court next considered the constitutional sufficiency of
the statute as applied. The defendants argued that it was unconuncon
stitutional to require their appearance in the District of Columbia
unless they had minimum contracts with that district. They
pressed the analogy of fourteenth amendment due process limitalimita
tions on the assertion of state court jurisdiction and suggested
. that similar limitations should apply in federal question cases.
The court of appeals also rejected this argument. In its view,
there was no basis for concluding that limitations placed on state
jurisdic
courts applied as well to congressional authorization of jurisdiction in federal courts. It felt that there was no magic to state
boundaries since Congress could redraw the federal districts at
anytime ignoring state lines-or even reducing the number of
federal courts, to "one ... or a mere handful."47 Thus, it reamemo
44. 569 F.2d at 3-7. The district court's opinion was an unreported memorandum decision which is set out in some detail by the coun of appeals. Id at 3
n.15. The court of appeals questioned why the district court did not resenT on
the question of transfer (which it denied) until it decided the motion to dismiss
so that it would have had the option to transfer at that point. The coun found
support for this in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463. 466-67 (1962). 569
F.2d at 3 n.15. For a discussion of Goldlmor, see infra note 216.
45. 569 F.2d at 4-7.
46. The court held that section 1391 (e) was applicable to suits for money
damages against federal officials in their individual capacity if the official inin
flicted the injury "under color of legal authority" as opposed to simply a perper
sonal act. Id. at 5 & n.43. The United States Supreme Coun ultimately reversed
on this point. See infra note 59.
47. 569 F.2d at 9 & n.72. The question has at least been raised as to
whether there is any significance to the fact that Congress has. with rare excep-
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soned, since there is no special significance to the boundaries of
districts, and since Congress could create a situation which would
necessitate nationwide service of process, it must have the power
to do so. As a result, it rejected the view of those courts which
had determined federal jurisdiction to be subject to the same
"fairness standard" as state court jurisdiction when service was
made outside the federal judicial district. 48 Implicit in this analyanaly
sis is the assumption that constitutional limitations on the asserasser
tion of federal jurisdiction are foreclosed because the assertion of
such jurisdiction is different than the assertion of jurisdiction by a
state court.
A similar problem was faced in Driver v. Helms,49 a class action
brought in the Rhode Island Federal District Court against varivari
ous government officials who allegedly violated the plaintiffs' concon
stitutional rights by interfering with first class mail. Some of the
defendants, who neither resided in nor had any contacts with
Rhode Island, filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, insufinsuf
ficiency of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. 50
In a detailed opinion the district court denied the motions. It
concluded that Congress had authorized the assertion of personal
jurisdiction on a nationwide basis under the statute. The court
reasoned that the defendants were all within the United States
and since it was only asserting sovereignty, there was no extraterextrater
ritorial assertion of jurisdiction involved. This situation was
tion, chosen not to have districts cross state lines. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1106 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
48. 569 F.2d at 9 & n.74. The court cited Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co., 397 F.2d I, 3 (3d Cir. 1968) and Lone Star Package Car Co. v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) as examples of
courts applying a fairness test. It pointed out that Fraley relied on LOlle Star and
the latter relied on United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795,
818 (1948) which had considered a fairness analysis in dealing with a nonresinonresi
dent British corporation. The Brigg's court stated that an attempt to assert juju
risdiction over a defendant not within the United States is a different matter
from asserting jurisdiction over one within its borders. See illfra text accompanyaccompany
ing notes 87-89.
49. 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977), ajf'd in part alld rev'd ill part, 577 F.2d 147
(1st Cir. 1978), rev'd Oil other gmullds sub 110111., Stafford v. Briggs. 444 U.S. 527
(1980). Plaintiffs claimed violation of their rights under the first, fourth. fifth
and ninth amendments to the United States Constitution, and sought damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief. Subject matter jurisdiction was based on
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1339, 1343, 1361 (1982) and 5 U.S.C. § 702. 74 F.R.D. at
387.
50. The district court set up a procedure to deal with the preliminary momo
tions and limited its opinion to the motions referred to in the text as well as
plaintiffs' motion to certify the class and a motion to dismiss defendant Clarence
Kelly, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 74 F.R.D. at 387.
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therefore distinct from that in which a state attempted to assert
jurisdiction over a party beyond its borders, or the United States
attempted to assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. As long
as the defendant is within the sovereign's territorial limits, all that
due process required was adequate notice. 51
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit undertook consideration of the question of personal jurisjuris
52
diction. Appellants argued that section 1391(e) only dealt with
venue, not personal jurisdiction. They further argued that, if secsec
tion 1391(e) did authorize the assertion of personal jurisdiction, it
was unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to individuals
lacking minimum contacts with the state in which the court was
located. The court of appeals first concluded that section 1391 (e)
was a jurisdictional provision. 53 It then considered the question
of constitutional impediments to such an assertion of jurisdiction.
The argument that minimum contacts were necessary to lele
gitimize jurisdiction was rejected. Concurring with the district
court's view, the court of appeals concluded that contacts analysis
was only relevant when state courts were involved because a
state's sovereignty was circumscribed by its boundaries. But such
boundaries were irrelevant to federal assertions of jurisdiction bebe
cause the federal government's sovereignty is only limited by nana
tional borders.54 Using language similar to that of the Briggs
court, the First Circuit pointed out that Congress could draw its
judicial districts anyway it wished, and therefore, federal court juju
risdiction was not limited by state boundaries.""
In response to appellant's argument regarding unfairness
and due process violations, the court indicated that federal offioffi
cials have to accept this possibility of being sued in distant forums
51. !d. at 391 n.6.
52. 577 F.2d at 154-57. The First Circuit, however, first disposed of a
number of preliminary issues. The court concluded that section I :~!) I (e) did not
apply to former government officials, but only to current gO\TnJment o/licials.
It also held that the section permitted personal damage actions. frl. at 1-l!1-5-l.
This latter point was the basis for reversal by the United States Suprcmc Coun.
See il/fra note 59.
53. The court pointed out that while the section was labeled "\·('nue." the
language therein clearly allowed service bv mail bevolld the territorial limits of
the state as an exception to the g'eneral provisions (1I' service prO\'ided in rule
4(l). The court also pointed out the legislative histor\' which supported the vie\\'
of the section as a jurisdictional provision. 577 F.2d at 155-56. For a furthl'1'
discussion SPP SIIpm note 35.
54. 577 F.2d at 156 n.25.
55. Id. at 156-57.
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given the broad range of people affected by their official acts.5O
In addition, the court felt that the district court's ability to transtrans
fer actions protected the defendants against any excessive burbur
den.',7 The court felt that proper notice, reasonably calculated to
inform the defendant of the pendency of the action, was the only
due process limitation on Congress. The court found this rere
5H
quirement satisfied.
The United States Supreme Court reversed Briggs and Driver
on the grounds that section 1391 (e) did not apply to actions for
money damages, and, therefore, the actions brought were not
proper under the statute. 59 By basing its decision on a limiting
statutory construction, the majority avoided the need to discuss
the question of nationwide service of process. Justice Stewart disdis
senting, joined by Justice Brennan, made the only comment relerele
vant to the jurisdictional question. He rejected the defendants'
contacts argument saying:
The short answer to this argument is that due propro
cess requires only certain minimum contacts between the
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186; International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310. The issue is not whether it
is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of
litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether
the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases
before us involved suits against residents of the United
States in the courts of the United States. No due process
problem exists. (iO
It is interesting to note that while the lower courts and Justice
Stewart are emphatic in stating that the presence of the defendant
'within the sovereign's borders ends all due process considera56. IrI. at 157. Bill .1('1' Stafford Y. Briggs. 444 U.S. 527. 544-45 (1980). For a
discussion of Siafford. sec illfra note 208.
57. Srp 28 U .S.C.
1404(a) (1982) (providing for transfer of actions).
58. In support of this the court cited Mariash \'. Morrill. 4% F.2d II ;~8.
1143 (2d Cir. 1974). 'rhe court concluded that certified mail met this test. 5i7
F.2d at 157.
5!1. 444 C.S. 527. 540-45.
GO. fd. at 554 (Stewart . .J.. dissenting): ([((Ord Leroy \'. Creat \\". United
Corp .. 44:~ u.s. 173. 192 (White . .J .. dissenting) (simply states conclusion that
there arc "no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of jurisjuris
diction by the United States over its residents") (citing' Fitzsimmons Y. Barton.
5H!) F.2d 3,W (7th Cir. I!J79)).

*
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reations, except as to notice, they do not state any compelling rea
sons for this conclusion. It is arguable that due process
limitations on service of process should be concerned with factors
relating to fairness which go beyond sovereign power. 61 If this is
so, nationwide service of process would necessarily be subject to
greater restrictions than simply fair notice.
b.

The Federal Interpleader Act

The Federal Interpleader Act was originally passed by Con
Congress to deal with situations in which insurance companies were
faced with multiple claims to the proceeds of a policy and the
claimants were located in different jurisdictions. 62 Since there
was no single jurisdiction which could obtain personal jurisdicjurisdic
tion over all the necessary parties, it was impossible for the com
companies to use common-law interpleader procedure to avoid
potential multiple liability.63 Congress solved this problem by al
alG4
lowing nationwide service of process in these cases.
In interpleader cases reaching the Supreme Court, the issue
of the constitutional power to exercise such nationwide service
has not yet been addressed. Thus, possible fifth amendment due
61. See illfra text accompanying notes 107-58.
62. 3A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~
22.06 (2d ed. 1987). This statutory interpleader is distinct from interpleader
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 22 which provides for interpleader under state law
without the restrictions of the statute, but also without the benefits of nation
nationwide service of process. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 V.S.
523,528 n.3 (1967); MOORE, supra, ~~ 22.13 at 22-120, 22.04[2.-2] at 22-33.
personaljuris63. When all the claimants live in a single jurisdiction so that personaljuris
diction could be obtained over them, interpleader permits the so-called stake
stakeholder to sue them all in either state or federal court. The stakeholder mav then
deposit the funds in court and all the claimants are enjoined from suing the
enstakeholder. The claimants then litigate amongst themselves the question of en
titlement to the fund. See gellerally Hazard & Moskovitz, .-111 Hisloriml alld Criliral
deAllal,\·sis of Illlelpleader, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 706 (1964). The Supreme Court de
cided shortly before the adoption of the statute that ill /'fill and quasi ill /'f'I1/ jurisjuris
diction could not be used to bind nonresidents in interpleader. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Sfe gfllerally Seeburger. The Frdemll.ollgFrdemll.ollg
Arm: The Cses of Divmily. or Taill'l So. J/rGee. 10 IND. L. RE\'. 480. 495-500
(1977).
64. The statutory requirements for nationwide service of process are
(I) that there be $500 at stake, (2) that at least two of the advel'se claimants be of
diverse citizenship, and (3) that the plaintiff deposit the fund with the coun
clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). In addition. the action must be brought in a
judicial district where at least one of the c1aimal1ls resides. 28 U .S.c. § 1397. If
these requirements are met then process may be sen'ed in any judicial district
pro
where a claimant resides, withoUl limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. Whether process could be served on nonresidents of the United States has been left open by
the Supreme Court. State Farm Fire & Casualty CO. Y. Tashire. 386 ll.S. 523.
537 n.18 (1967).
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process limitations on its use are still an open question. 6 !} As indiindi
cated in the earlier discussion, it seems clear that Congress has
the power to authorize this broad jurisdictional scope, so the fact
that this question of power has not been raised in the context of
interpleader is not surprising. 66 But the absence of any real disdis
cussion of the due process question does not negate the existence
of due process concerns. There has been no conclusive statement
on this question. It can be argued, therefore, as Justice Stewart
suggested in his dissent in Briggs,67 that as long as the defendants
have minimum contacts with the United States there is no due
process problem in as much as the "particular sovereign" has
power over them. However, one might also argue that due propro
cess requires a reasonably convenient forum when the multi state
nature of the underlying controversy necessitates appearance in a
forum with little, if any, connection with certain defendants. At a
minimum, such an argument plays off due process interests
against interests in the economy and consistency in the resolution
of controversies. ml As indicated above,m) the purpose of the InIn
terpleader Act was to deal with situations in which no one court
could otherwise obtain jurisdiction over all of the parties. In th,e
absence of a statute, a stakeholder would be faced with the possipossi
bility of multiple lawsuits and the consequent substantial risk of
inconsistent results. In such cases resolution of the problem nene
cessitates that some claimants must be subjected to jurisdiction in
a district in which they would not normally have to appear. But
since this is a special type of case and since at least one claimant
must reside in the district where the suit is filed, there is an essenessen
tial pragmatic fairness which appears to justify the assertion .of
jurisdiction. Such an analysis would allow for the continued use
of nationwide service of process in interpleader, while establish65. The interpleader cases reaching the Court were State Farm Fire & CasCas
ualty Co. v. Tashire. 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining' Co .. 308
U.S. 66 (1939); Worcester County Trust CO. Y. Rilev. 302 U.S. 292 (1937); DuDu
gas v, American Sur. Co .. 300 U.S. 414 (1937); Sanders Y. Armour Fertilizer
Works. 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Levinson Y. United States. 258 U.S. 198 (1922).
'rhe question of nationwide service of process was alluded to. but not discussed.
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tashil'l'.
Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co .. 363 F.2d 7. 10 (9th Cir. 19(Hi). I'l'l'd.
386 U.S. 523 (1967); .Iff' gfllemlly Seeburger. sllpm note G:~. at 484-85 & 493-502.
(i(i. ALI STUDY . .III/no note 26.
(i7, SI'P JII/))'{/ text accompanying note 60.
G8. Sf'P Foster. slipm note 7. at 30-31; Hazard. 111/1'1:1/0 Ii' 1'1'11111'. 74 N\\,. U.L.
REV, 71 I. 717-18 (1979); Traynor. Is This COllflir/ H('{IlIy Xm.I.I(I/:l'? 3 7 TEX. L.
R~:\'. (i57. ()G3 (1950).
G!J. Sf'P ,II/pm notes G2-63.
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ing a more flexible test for consideration of this question in other
contexts. 70
c.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 71 was adopted by ConCon
gress in response to demands for regulation of the abuses in the
securities market. 7'2 Section 27 of the Act 73 provides for exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts for suits under
the Act. The section then goes on to provide, in relevant part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to
regula
enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the disdis
trict wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. 74
The meaning of this language as a basis for nationwide serser
vice of process has been considered numerous times. 7 !> The
courts have generally agreed that this section provides for nationnation
wide service, and that Congress can authorize such assertions of
jurisdiction. 76 Having reached these conclusions, courts have
gone on to consider the due process implications of such asserasser
tions of jurisdiction.
In Mariash v. Morrill,77 the plaintiff filed suit in the Southern
District of New York against a number of Massachusetts defenddefend
ants who were involved in selling shares in Viatron Corporation
70. See infra text accompanying notes 193-98.
71. 15 V.S.C. § § 78a-78KK (1982).
at
72. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 784-85 (2d cd. 1961). The act attempts to regulate these excesses in four ways. "Every non-exempt security
listed on an exchange must be registered by its issuer. Periodic reports mllst be
filed thereafter. The solicitation of proxies must comply with the Commission's
rules. And there are certain controls over insider-trading practices." Id. at 785.
For a brief introduction to the Act and its amendments see R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SEClIRITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 441-48 (5th cd. 1982).
73. 15 V.S.c. § 78aa (1982).
74. Id.
75. E.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.),
art. dmil'd, 417 V.S. 932 (1974); S-G Sec., Inc. \'. Fuqua II1\'. Co., 466 F. Supp.
1114 (D. Mass. 1978); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656 (E.n.N.Y. 197(i). SI'I'
il/fm note 83.
7n . .'IeI' cases cited sujJm note 75.
77. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
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as part of a private placement exempt from registration under the
Securities Act of 1933.713 The complaint alleged that the defend
defendplain
ants had conspired to favor one of the defendants over the plaintiff in the delivery of an opinion letter, thus making it impossible
for the plaintiff to sell his shares. 79 This was alleged to be a viola
violation of section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341>0 and
sectherefore nationwide service of process was authorized under sec
tion 27. Among the defendants were eleven members of the law
firm who had been Viatron's Boston attorneys.81
These eleven defendants moved to dismiss on a variety of
grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The district
court rejected the plaintiff's view that section 27 was a basis for
personal jurisdiction, viewing it only as a provision governing
subject matter jurisdiction and venue. 82 The district court also
concluded that personal jurisdiction had not been established
under the New York long-arm statute and so dismissed the action
as to that group.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the SecSec
ond Circuit began by pointing out that section 27 did provide for
nationwide service of process whenever a claim is stated under
the Act. R3 The court then went on to consider whether there was
any limit to this assertion of jurisdiction. In its view the assertion
of nationwide service was limited by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 84 But it concluded that all that due process rere
quired was notice reasonably calculated to inform the defendants
78. Section 77e requires the registration of any security sold in interstate
commerce and section 77d(2) exempts transactions which do not involve a pub
public offer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77d(2) (1982).
79. Plaintiff needed the opinion letter in order to release his shares from
the restrictions of the private placement. It was alleged that this was delayed so
marthat defendant Burwick could put his substantial holdings in Viatron on the mar
ket first. When the plaintiff finally attempted to sell the shares he was informed
that the presence of these other shares on the market would make it difhcult to
sell the plaintiff's shares. 496 F.2d at 1141.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
81. Originally twelve members of the firm were sued. but the dismissal of
one was stipulated by the parties. 496 F.2d at 114\. 1142 n.5.
82. This was an unreported opinion which Judge Kaufman onl\" alludes to
in his own opinion. Jd. at 1140.
83. Id. at 1142-43. The court indicated that it did not need to consider
whether there was personal jurisdiction under New York law because section 27
authorized nationwide service of process. In the court's view it was simply "too
late in the day" to argue otherwise and found support for this ,·ie'.\" in Interna
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco. 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1(74) and Leasco Data
Processing E.quipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1(72). Jd.
84. 496 F.2d at 1143. See slipra note 20.
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of the action so that they would have an opportunity to be
heard. 85 Since there was no dispute over the notice given to the
defendants, the court concluded that due process had been
satisfied.
In response to the defendants' argument that due process
also required "minimal contacts" with the state where the district
court sat, the court said that such a test was irrelevant to an asser
assertion of jurisdiction by the United States. It stated:
It is not the State of New York but the United States
"which would exercise its jurisdiction over them [the de
defendants]." And plainly, where, as here, the defendants
reside within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, the "minimal contacts," required to justify the
federal government's exercise of power over them, are
present. Indeed, the "minimal contacts" principle does
not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating
the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based
proon nationwide, but not extraterritorial, service of pro
cess. It is only the latter, quite simply, which even raises
a question of the forum's power to assert control over
the defendant. 86
In so reasoning, the court sought to clarify an earlier Second
Circuit opinion, Leaseo Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 87
In that case, also a section 10(b) action, personal jurisdiction was
also based on section 27. The court used a minimum contacts
analysis to decide whether due process had been satisfied. The
iV/anash court explained that this was not because such an analysis
was necessary in all actions under section 27, but rather because
the foreign defendants were not "present" within the United
States. HH As such the question was one of extraterritorial service
beyond the borders of the United States. Therefore, the Leaseo
defendcourt felt it necessary to determine whether the foreign defend
ants had sufficient connection with the United States to warrant
an assertion of jurisdiction. H!J
85. 496 F.2d at 1143. In support of this proposition the court simply cited.
without explanation. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235. 245 (1958); \"'alker \'.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane \'. Central HanO\'er Bank &
Trust Co .• 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
86. 496 F.2d at 1143 (emphasis supplied by the court) (footnotes omilled).
87. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir 1972).
88. 496 F.2d at 1143 n.9.
89. 468 F.2d at 1340; (laoI'd III I'P FOLOchromc, Inc.. 377 F. Supp. 26. 29
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), af['d. 517 F.2d 512 (1975).
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A similar view on this issue was taken by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzsimmons v. Barton. 9o
The court of appeals reviewed a dismissal by the district court of a
nonresident defendant in a securities fraud action under the SeSe
curities Exchange Act of 1934 on the grounds that he lacked suffisuffi
cient contacts with Illinois to satisfy its long-arm statute. 91 The
court of appeals began by pointing out that section 27 provided
for nationwide service, and therefore the Illinois statute did not
have to be consideredY2 Having reached this conclusion, the
court considered whether there were any restraints placed on this
service by the due process clause. The court concluded that
under the reasoning of Shaffer v. Heitner 93 and International Shoe Co.
v. Washington 94 a "fairness" standard was to be applied in reviewreview
ing all assertions of jurisdiction. However, it went on to say that
this "fairness" related to the "exercise of power by a particular
sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating
in a distant forum. "95 Based on this test the court felt that the
resi
assertion of jurisdiction was fair since the defendant was a resident of the United States and therefore had sufficient contacts
with the "particular sovereign" seeking to exercise power over
himYI; In rejecting the idea that fairness, for jurisdictional pur90. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
91. !d. at 332. The district court decision was unreported.
92. The court stated that rule 4(e) authorizes the use of the law of the state
man
in which the district court sits when no United States statute provides for manner of service. Since Congress had authorized service, then under rule 4(e) that
is sufficient, and no reference to state law was necessary. 589 F.2d at 332. Ifan
action is brought pursuant to a federal statute which does not provide for service
of process then it would be necessary to resort to a special provision such as rule
4(f) or to the law of the state in which the district court sits to accomplish service
outside that state's borders. E.g. Volk Corp. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Serv .. 432 F.
Supp.1179, 1181 &n.2(S.D.N.Y.1977). Forafurtherdiscussion,seesllpmnote
17.
93. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
94. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
95. 589 F.2d at 333. The court recognized that both Shajffr and llltp/'llatiolla/
Shoe were cases dealing with state court jurisdiction, but felt that the broad artic
articulation of a fairness standard should be applied to all such assertions. ld. at 332.
96. The court found additional support for its method of analysis in the
older cases approving of Congress' power to require a defendant to appear in
any court of the United States when she has been served within its borders. It
cited .1JllIphrpl', 326 U.S .438 (1946); Robertsoll 268 U.S. 619 (1925): United States
v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); and it also cited .1Jaria.lh, 496 F.2d
1138 as supportive in the context of section 27. ld. at 333-34. Similarh', the
Ninth Circuit has held that minimum contacts with the United States is all that is
Pro
required under section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934. Securities IIwestor Procontection Corp. v. Vigman, 7()4 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985). There the court con
cluded defendants who were residents of the United States had sullicient
minimum contacts to be subject to personal jurisdiction in any federal dislI'ict
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poses, also related to the imposition of the burden of litigating in
a particular forum, it said that such concerns could be dealt with
in the context of deciding questions of change of venueY7
In so ruling, the court disapproved of the "fairness" test rere
lating to the burden of litigating in a particular forum which had
been set out in Oxford First C01P. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.9H by a
district court in denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdicjurisdic
tion under section 27. The Fitzsimmons court viewed such a "fair"fair
ness" test as irrelevant to the question of a particular sovereign
exercising power; rather it viewed fairness as pertinent to quesques
tions of the convenience of the forum for purposes of venueY!) It
stated that these factors were relevant to the "non-jurisdictional
doctrine offorum non conveniens," and that they were therefore inin
appropriate to determine the constitutionality of personal
jurisdiction. 100
The cases which have considered the question of nationwide
service under section 27 have recognized that the fifth amendamend
ment does place limitations on Congress' power to authorize nacourt, but remanded the question of whether a defendant who was not a resident
of the United States has sufficient contacts with the United States to make it
reasonably foreseeable that it would be subjected to suit in the United States. Id.
at 1316.
97. The court viewed these questions as relating to the issue of fOI"//I1/ 11011
convelliells in considering motions for change of venue pursuant to 28 U .S.C.
§ 1404(a). Id. at 334.
98. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). That court set out five factors as
relevant to its fairness analysis. Id. at 203-04. For a further discussion, see infra
text accompanying notes 190-92.
99. 589 F.2d at 334 n.5.
100. Id. at 334 & n.5. In that footnote, the court criticized the Oxford Firsl
court for not simply applying its factors to the concept off01'11111 nOli cO/lvenims. It
then stated:
Oxford First considered this argument and rejected it on the ground that
it avoids the issue of constitutional restrictions. 372 F. Supp. at 203
n.24. However, if these factors are of constitutional significance, an isis
sue that we do not decide, we do not understand why they would be any
less so because applied under the rubric of fOl'uIII /lOll collvenii'lls instead
of personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 334 n.5. This statement by the court seems to misperceive the problem
before it. It assumes that concepts of fairness are irrelevant to personal jurisdicjurisdic
tion because they have always been considered under the doctrine of fO/'ll1l/ /1011
conveniens. Such a sharp distinction between these concepts does not appear jusjus
tified for the reasons indicated in the next section of this article. See illfra text
accompanying notes 161-73. In addition, to avoid the question of the constituconstitu
tional significance of a fairness concept, under whatever rubric, is to beg the
question. As long as such factors do not have constitutional significance. courts
will continue to exercise broad discretion in deciding to hold, transfer or dismiss
a case with only limited appellate review. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. 330 U.S.
501,508 (1947).
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tionwide service of process. While a due process standard of
fairness has been suggested by some courts,IOI the trend in auau
thority seems to be that due process only requires adequate nono
tice. In turn this principle is based on the fact that the minimum
contacts test developed in cases such as International Shoe, 102 HanHan
son v. Denckla 103 and Shaffer v. Heitner 104 is relevant only in deterdeter
mining whether a particular sovereign can assert jurisdiction.
Thus, in considering state court jurisdiction, the question is relerele
vant in determining the constitutionality of such assertions bebe
yond state borders. In cases based on nationwide service of
process, it would be relevant only in cases involving defendants
101. E.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191
(E.D. Pa. 1974). A number of other courts have suggested this. For example, in
United States ex rei. Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the
court concluded that section 1391 (e) authorized the assertion of personal jurisjuris
diction in a habeas corpus proceeding for discharge from the army. But it went
on to say that it was still necessary to determine if the defendant had "sufficient
contacts with this district such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play." /d. at 478. A federal district court sitting in
Iowa came to the conclusion that a defendant had to have sufficient contacts with
Iowa to comport with due process even where jurisdiction was based on section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366
F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Iowa, C.D. 1973). However that court reached its result bebe
cause it felt bound by Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973), which came to that conclusion in a section 27 suit against a Canadian
corporation not present in the United States. As we have already seen the asserasser
tion of jurisdiction over defendants who are either not citizens of, or are not
found in, the United States has received different treatment. A fairness test was
also considered in general terms by the court, in Dijulio v. Digicon, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 963 (D. Md. 1971), in an action where jurisdiction was asserted both
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Dijl/Dijl/
lio was disagreed with by the court, in Stern v. GobeiofF, 332 F. Supp. 909 (D.
Md. 1971), but the court added that even if Dijl/fio was correct the defendant in
Stem had sufficient contacts with the district for a suit under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Finally, in Kipperman v. McMc
Cone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976), which was a class action under section
1391 (e) seeking relief for the CIA's opening of mail intended for the Soviet
Union, the court stated that section 1391 (e) provided a mechanism for effective
com
service but it was still necessary to decide if the assertion of jurisdiction comported with due process. In support of this it cited, illteralia, United States ex rei.
Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969).
Having stated this, the court seems to have decided SI/b silelltio that it was obliged
to determine whether jurisdiction could be asserted under the California longlong
arm statute and minimum contacts. 422 F. Supp. at 871.
It should be noted that subsequent to the decisions in Wheeler and Rudick the
United States Supreme Court decided that section 1391 (e) did not extend jurisjuris
diction in habeas corpus cases. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4
(1971). It is necessary that the "custodian" defendant be present or have concon
tacts with the district in which suit is brought. Id. at 490-91; Strait v. Laird, 406
U.S. 341, 345 n.2 (1972).
102. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
103. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
104. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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located outside the United States. But when defendants reside
within the United States the necessity of requiring more than adeade
I05
quate notice does not exist.
In reaching this conclusion, these courts seemed to have fofo
cused exclusively on the power aspect of jurisdiction, while failing
to consider how concepts of territorial sovereignty have been supsup
plemented by principles of fairness and convenience in the state
court personal jurisdiction area. I06 This latter movement sugsug
gests that the concept of due process is broad enough to encomencom
pass a fairness analysis even where sovereign power exists. The
next section will consider why such an analysis is appropriate in
the area of nationwide service of process. Once this proposition
is established consideration will be given to the factors relevant to
deciding the fairness of assertions of jurisdiction in this area.

III.

A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

The difficulty with the "power focused" analysis in this area
is that concepts of fairness are invariably equated with power over
the defendant in considering the due process ramifications of exex
traterritorial service of process. 107 Once it is determined that the
defendant is within the sovereign'S power, courts have assumed
that there is no due process limitation on requiring such a dede
fendant to appear in a particular court. 108 This is a most grudggrudg
ing application of the concept of due process in the area of
personal jurisdiction. The justification for this ungenerous appliappli
cation of due process is found in the assumption that a "minimum
contacts" approach to jurisdictional questions is only relevant to
the power of sovereign states to act beyond their borders.loD
However, the Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that
the due process limitations on state court jurisdiction are inin
tended to function not solely as limitations on sovereign power,
105. E.g., 111ariash, 496 F.2d at 1143 nn.8 & 9.
106. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286
(1980); Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143,545 P.2d 264,127 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1976); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 47, at 1106. For a further discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 110-39.
107. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell. 468 F.2d 1326,
1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that although Exchange Act authorized service of
process anywhere, it did not do so beyond bounds of due process which in this
case meant fair notice of suit).
108. E.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart.]., dissentdissent
ing). For a discussion of this point in the context of the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962, see supra text accompanying notes 45-61.
109. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart,]., dissenting).
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but also to ensure that the defendant receives the protection of a
fair forum.
A.

State Court jurisdiction Cases

In order to understand the nature of these dual functions, it
will be helpful to briefly review the development of these concon
cepts in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Beginning with Pennoyer
v. Nelfi 10 the Supreme Court established that assertions of jurisjuris
diction were to be limited by the due process clause and that in
order to establish jurisdiction a tribunal must be able to assert
physical power within the territorial limits of the state. II I This
standard remained the hallmark of jurisdictional limitations for
the next sixty-eight years. In this period, however, many situasitua
tions arose in which a strict "power" principle did not provide a
satisfactory resolution of jurisdictional questions, especially in a
society increasingly confronted with conflicts between parties
from different states. 112 It was during this period that the Court
developed a number of fictions to justify the assertion of jurisdicjurisdic
tion within the framework of a "power" analysis. I 13
Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 114 the Court atat
tempted to revamp its analysis to deal with this situation. In that
corpo
case the question was whether the defendant, a Delaware corporation based in Missouri, was amenable to suit in the State of
110. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For an analysis of the period prior to Pennoyer, see
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Persollallljurisdictioll of
State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569,56970 (1958); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
241, 252-62 (P. Kurland ed.).
.
III. 95 U.S. at 720-22; Clermont, Restating Territon'al jurisdiction and Venue
for State and Fedeml Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1981). Technically,
the holding in PemlOyer was that the state court judgment was to be denied full
con
faith and credit, but its dicta clearly established the due process clause as controlling in this area, though it was not applicable to the case before the Court.
Kurland, supm note liD, at 572.
112. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
113. Thus, for example, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Court
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist who had been
involved in an automobile accident in the forum state by the fiction that he had
consented by his actions to the appointment of an agent within the jurisdiction
for service of process, thus making him present and subject to the power of the
tribunal. See also Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 US. 623 (1935). The
Supreme Court ultimately recognized the fictive nature of "consent," Olberding
v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953), as well as other fictions based
on "presence." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317
pro
(1945). An excellent summary of this period in the development of a due process analysis by the Court may be found in Kurland, supm note 110, at 573-86.
114. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

HeinOnline -- 33 Vill. L. Rev. 24 1988

1988]

NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS

25

Washington to collect payments owed to Washington's unemunem
ployment compensation fund. The Court, speaking through
ChiefJustice Stone, began by rejecting the need for physical prespres
ence in the state as the sole means of asserting jurisdiction:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgjudg
ment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. PenPen
noyer v. Neff . ... But now that the capias ad respondendum
has given way to personal service of summons or other
form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintemainte
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."115
While the Court suggested a new basis for personal jurisdiction in
terms of the now familiar concept of "minimum contacts" and
"fair play and substantial justice," the opinion created difficulties
because this new standard was abstract, amorphous and difficult
to define in the concrete instance. I 16 At some points the Court
focused on "minimum contacts" indicating that a key question
was the defendant's activities in the forum and how they related
to the cause of action. 117 At other times, it spoke in broad
terms about reasonableness I 18 and "'estimate[s] of the
inconveniences.' "119
As a result, it was unclear what precise test was to be used by
courts in resolving jurisdictional questions. However, it was clear
115. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
116. The amorphous nature of the majority's standard led Justice Black to
file a separate opinion decrying the use of "elastic standards" such as "fair
play," "justice" and "reasonableness" which might unduly limit the power of
states to assert jurisdiction. Id. at 325; Kurland, supra note 110, at 590.
117. 326 U.S. at 317-19; Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to All/bivalence in
Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61,64 (1977); Clermont, supra note Ill, at
415-16; Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Penn oyer, McGee v. InternaInterna
tional Life Insurance Co. andJun·sdiction Over Individuals, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
285,287-88 (1958).
118. 326 u.S. at 320.
119. /d. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139,
141 (2d Cir. 1930)). As Professor Kurland has suggested, Intemational Shoe may
have "served rather to destroy existent doctrine than to establish new criteria for
the Supreme Court and other courts to follow." Kurland, supra note 110, at 586.
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that "fairness" was to be a term in the equation. In the next sevsev
eral years the Court decided a number of cases which appeared to
increase the emphasis on "fairness" in deciding jurisdictional
questions. In particular, this was suggested by the Supreme
Court's opinion in McGee v. International Life Insurance CO.120 In
McGee, a California resident sought to assert jurisdiction in CaliCali
fornia over a Texas insurance company for recovery on an insurinsur
ance policy issued by the defendant to her son. The only contacts
the defendant had with California were an agreement, sent by
mail, to insure the defendant and the acceptance of premium paypay
ments, mailed from California by the defendant. 121 In concluding
that, consistent with due process, California could assert jurisdicjurisdic
balanc
tion over the defendant, the Court focused its analysis on balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the state to
decide whether the assertion of jurisdiction was reasonable. As
the Court stated:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interinter
est in providing effective means of redress for its resiresi
dents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were
120. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In the period between International Shoe and McMc
Gee the Court decided three cases which were consistent with the development
of a concern for fairness. In Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643 (1950), Justice Black, speaking for four justices concluded in an opinion, in
which Justice Douglas concurred, that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction
to regulate its advertising and sale of insurance to citizens of Virginia. In the
course of the opinion Justice Black, in dicta, suggested that factors such as concon
venience of the plaintiff and the state's interest in asserting jurisdiction were
relevant to its analysis. Id. at 648-49. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court approved the assertion of jurisdiction
of New York over all claimants to common trust funds located in New York
focus
based on the need of the state to administer and close these trusts without focusing on defendants' activities. Id. at 312-13. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court said it would be consistent with due
process for Ohio to assert jurisdiction over a corporation created under the laws
of the Philippines, which operated in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of
the Philippines, for an action relating to events occurring outside of Ohio. The
opinion states that continuous business activity in the state is enough for due
process. Id. at 445-46.
121. 355 U.S. at 221-22. Upon the insured's death, and the defendant's
refusal to pay on the policy, his mother sued in California state court to recover
under the policy. California based jurisdiction on its statute which subjected
foreign corporations to suits based on insurance contracts with residents. JudgJudg
ment was obtained in California. When it could not be collected there, the
plaintiff sought to enforce it in Texas, which was the defendant's principal place
of business. Texas refused to enforce the judgment stating it was void under the
fourteenth amendment. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. Civ. App., 1956).
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forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State
in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims
were small or moderate individual claimants frequently
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a forfor
eign forum-thus in effect making the company judgjudg
ment proof. Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the
incompany's defense of suicide-will be found in the in
sured's locality. Of course there may be inconvenience
to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California
where it had this contract but certainly nothing which
amounts to a denial of due process. 122
To the extent that this language suggests that questions of
deterjurisdiction are to be resolved by balancing all interests to deter
mine a fair forum,123 it was undercut a year later by the Court's
decision in Hanson v. Denckla. 124 The Court in Hanson ruled that
Florida could not assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trust com
company in a suit involving the validity of a power of appointment
under a trust. ChiefJustice Warren, speaking for the majority in a
5-4 decision, made it clear that territorial power was still a key
issue in any due process analysis:
[T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonnon
residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Penn oyer v.
Neff . .. to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v.
guarWashington . ... Those restrictions are more than a guar
antee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite
to its exercise of power over him.125
122. 355 U.S. at 223-24.
123. In summarizing this period, Professor Kurland has said:
From International Shoe to International Life, the Supreme Court had
evolved a doctrine of non-interference with the exercise of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants by state courts. By lise of the "fairness"
test, suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in derivation from Judge
Learned Hand, the Court had made the question of the propriety of
pur
such personal jurisdiction a matter of fact which, for all practical purposes, was not reviewable in the Supreme Court.
Kurland, supra note 110, at 610.
124. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
125. Id. at 251. The Court not only emphasized the importance of power,
but also appeared to resurrect the importance of categorization of actions as ill
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retro
While the opinion has been criticized by commentators as a retrogressive approach to jurisdiction based on unclear reasoning, 126 it
is at least fair to say that, as the language quoted above suggests,
the opinion does not reject the significance of a "fairness" analyanaly
sis, but rather seeks to reenforce the importance of sovereign
power as a key element in ascertaining the limitations on state
court jurisdiction. 127 Having made that point, but having not rere
solved the relationship of "power" and "fairness" in this area, the
Court remained silent on the issue for almost twenty years.
Finally, in Shaffer v. Heitner 128 the Court decided the first in a
series of cases which attempted to clarify the elements of a due
process analysis. In Shaffer the Court rejected the assertion of juju
risdiction by Delaware over nonresident directors of a Delaware
corporation in a derivative action. The Court's most important
and significant statement in Shaffer was that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stanstan
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 129 However,
the Court also sought to evaluate whether assertions of jurisdicjurisdic
tion could be justified by examining "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation."13o Implicit in this apap
proach was a recognition that both "power" and "fairness" were
relevant to a jurisdictional analysis. 131 Similarly, in Kulko v. SupeSupe
rior Court 132 the Court recognized the relevance of "power" and
"fairness" in this area when it rejected California's assertion of
jurisdiction over a nonresident father in a child support case. 133
rem, quasi in relll and in personam. This was after having appeared to reject the
significance of these categories in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950).
126. E.g., Clermont, supra note Ill, at 419; Hazard, supra note 110, at 244.
127. The majority's disagreement with the dissent is that the latter, in an
opinion written by Justice Black, would focus on the reasonableness of the fofo
rum as the key to deciding state court jurisdiction. 357 U.S. at 259. InterestInterest
ingly. both sides sought support from the language of the International Shoe
opinion, which only means that that opinion raised both criteria as relevant to a
due process analysis without clarifying their relationship. See supra text accomaccom
panying notes 116-19.
128. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
129. Id. at 212.
130. !d. at 204.
131. Clermont, supra note Ill, at 421 n.55. At least one judge has viewed
Shaffer as central to a revised analysis of nationwide service cases because of its
"abandonment of territorial sovereignty strictures" in a due process analysis.
Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 828 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J.,
dissenting), mt. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1981).
132. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
133. !d. at 92.
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The Court concluded that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts
with California to assert control over him,134 and thus it did not
consider other interests which might have been relevant to the
fairness of the forum. 135
The Court reenforced and made the relationship between
"power" and "fairness" explicit in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Wood50n.l 36 In that case Oklahoma sought to assert jurisdiction
over two New York corporations neither of which did business in
Oklahoma. These defendants were involved in the sale of an au
automobile in New York to the plaintiffs who were then residents of
New York. Subsequently the plaintiffs left New York and were
involved in an accident in Oklahoma in which the vehicle burned.
They filed a products liability suit in Oklahoma against, among
others, the two New York corporations, who then moved to disdis
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court refused to overturn a denial of this motion by the trial
court. 137 In reversing this decision, Justice White, speaking for
six Justices, began by asserting the dual purposes of a minimum
contacts-due 'process analysis:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen
to perform two related, but distinguishable functions. It
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure
that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co
co38
equal sovereigns in a federal system.l
After analyzing these functions in general terms, the Court concon
cluded by stating that even a convenient state forum does not
decomport with due process if the state lacks "power" over the de
fendants since the due process clause acts as an "instrument of
interstate federalism." 139 If, as the Court suggests, the functions
of sovereign power and fairness are related, and overreaching the
134. /d. at 101.
135. [d. at 98-10 1.

136. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
137. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla.
1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
138. 444 U.S. at 291-92.
139. !d. at 294, The Court reiterated this in a companion case to Woodsoll
which was decided the same day. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980);
Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Commellt Oil
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L.
REV. 407, 421 (1980).
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limits of sovereignty warrants a denial of jurisdiction, then should
it not follow that a violation of norms of fairness also warrant a
denial of jurisdiction?
The Court has shown an increased willingness to focus its
attention on the "fairness" issue in analyzing jurisdiction ques
questions. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee 140 this point was made clear in its review of a decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 141 The
Court of Appeals in Bauxites had affirmed a district court deci
deci142
to impose a sanction under rule 37(b)(2). The sanction,
sion
which established personal jurisdiction over a defendant, had
been ordered by the district court for failure to provide discovery
on the issue of jurisdiction as had been ordered. In the process of
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, Justice White
pointed out that personal jurisdiction placed "a restriction on juju
dicial power ... as a matter of individual liberty," and was therethere
fore waivable. 143 In a footnote he sought to clarify the underlying
concerns which govern personal jurisdiction and the application
of due process:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of
personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects
an element of federalism and the character of state sov
sovereignty vis-a-vis other states. . . . The restriction on
state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due ProPro
cess Clause. That Clause is the only source of the perper
sonal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself
makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore,
reif the federalism concept operated as an independent re
striction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction re•
qmrement
.... 144
Bauxites takes a step beyond Woodson in that it emphasizes the
Court's willingness to focus on the concept of fairness or an "in
"individualliberty interest" as the ultimate concern of the due pro140. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
141. Compagnie des Bauxites v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.
1981), ajJ'd, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
142. The opinion of the district court was unreported.
143. 456 U.S. at 702-03 & n.lO.
144. /d. at 702-03 n.l0.

HeinOnline -- 33 Vill. L. Rev. 30 1988

1988]

NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS

31

cess clause. The opinion makes it clear that simply focusing on
"soverthe traditional federalism questions of "power" and "sover
eignty" is not adequate in analyzing questions of personal jurisjuris
diction. Those questions are not the ones with which the due
process clause is concerned. Since due process ultimately
touches individual liberty interests, it follows that these interests
cannot be swept away without consideration when "power" is not
at issue as, for example, in the typical nationwide service cases.
The Court once against emphasized the importance of fairfair
ness over and above issues of power in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz. 145 In an opinion written by Justice Brennan,146 the
Court addressed the individual liberty interests which the due
process clause seeks to protect and delineated the factors relevant
to protecting those interests. 147 The Court stated that traditional
minimum contacts were necessary to establish the defendants' tie
with the forum much in the way the Court had required in Hanson
and Woodson,148 but, at the same time, it also emphasized the imim
portance of fairness factors once minimum contacts are estabestab
149
As the Court stated:
lished.
Once it has been decided that a defendant purposepurpose
fully established minimum contacts within the forum
State, these contacts may be considered in light of other
factors to determine whether the assertion of personal
substanjurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substan
tial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . .
Thus courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the
burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in
obadjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in ob
taining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies." World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
. . . . These considerations sometimes serve to establish
145. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
dis146. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan had written strong dis
sents in earlier cases. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S.
286.299 (1980) (Brennan.J.. dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186.219
(1977) (Brennan. J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Compa147. See 471 U.S. at 471-72 & n.13 (citing Insurance Corp. ofIr. v. Compa
gnie de Bauxites de Guinee. 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.1O (1982)).
148. /d. at 474-76.
149. /d. at 476-78.
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the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be rere
quired. . . . On the other hand, where a defendant who
purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelcompel
ling case that the presence of some other considerations
would render jurisdiction unreasonable. I 50
It is clear that the Court has reinforced the view that due propro
cess is concerned with more than questions of sovereign power,
and that in deciding personal jurisdiction questions in the state
court context the fairness to the defendant, i.e., the defendant's
individual liberty interests, is of central importance in determindetermin
ing personal jurisdiction even when the forum has sufficient concon
nections to justify an exertion of sovereign power.
B.

Application to Nationwide jurisdiction Cases

Such an analysis in the state court jurisdiction area must be
given serious consideration in the analogous area of nationwide
jurisdiction cases. In the nationwide service of process cases,
courts have correctly pointed out that a minimum contacts-due
process analysis which serves to limit coequal sovereigns is not
relevant to the power to assert jurisdiction within the United
States. 151 They have also recognized that such an analysis,
adapted from the state court jurisdiction analogue, is relevant to
assertions of jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the
United States. 152 Once attention is focused on assertions of jurisjuris
diction within the United States, however, it is inconsistent to
conclude that a minimum contacts-due process approach can be
discarded because, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, a sepasepa
rate function of that approach is to protect defendants from unfair
and distant litigation. Since both of these functions must be satissatis
fied to comport with due process, it is clear that the fair forum
function must be established in order for there to be a proper
ISO. !d. at 476-77 (citations omined). The concern of the Court for the
fairness of the forum was the basis for its judgment in Asahi Metal Industry v.
Superior Court, 107 S. Cl. 1026 (1987), that it would violate due process for
California to assert jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer. While the Court
divided evenly on the issue of minimum contacts, eight Justices agreed that it
would violate due process to assert jurisdiction because it would be an unfair
and unreasonable forum. [d. at 1033-35.
151. E.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
152. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972).
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assertion of jurisdiction. 153
This is particularly so in light of the Court's recogmtlOn in
Bauxites that all of the restrictions that due process requires are
intended to protect individual liberty interests of the defendant.
If individual liberty, or fairness, is the key, then whether or not
the defendant is within the sovereign's boundaries, and therefore
subject to its sovereign power, she is entitled to protection from
an unfair choice of forum. It is illogical to contend that a person
is protected from an unreasonable choice of forum only if she is a
defendant not subject to the sovereign's power; but once such
person is so subject, the due process clause would give no protecprotec
tion against an arbitrary and inconvenient choice of forum. Thus,
if a defendant lived in New Jersey and had no contacts with CaliCali
fornia, but was sued in California state court, the due process
clause would protect her from the burden of defending in that
distant forum. But if the suit were based on a violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the due process clause would
not protect her even if it were an unreasonable choice of fofo
154
rum.
The defendant's only hope would be to convince the
court to grant a transfer. '55
It might be argued that such a result is correct because ConCon
gress, in adopting certain remedial statutes, had decided that it is
of paramount importance to protect the potential plaintiffs even if
such protection results in greatly inconveniencing the party who
must defend far from home. 156 But this is only to accept the prinprin
ciple that Congress has the power to authorize nationwide service
153. 444 U.S. at 293-94; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1033-35 (1987).
154. Following the logic of those courts which suggest that due process
only requires fair notice in suits in which service is based on nationwide service
of process, it would also seem that any assertion of jurisdiction by a federal court
would only be limited by a fair notice test. Thus, if Corporation A were sued on
a federal question in a federal court located in State X and service was accomaccom
plished under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3) by serving an agent of the corporation who
was transiently present in the state taking a train through State X to State r, due
process would not require a denial of jurisdiction even if the corporation had no
other connection with State X. Such a result is compelled by a rejection of a
fairness due process standard when there is power over the defendant. Bllt see
supra note 17. See also Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE LJ. 289 (1956). A different result
may ensue if service is based on a state long-arm statute pursuant to Rule 4(e).
See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123 n.6 (1966).
155. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rell'd 011 other
grounds sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
156. E.g., Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Md. 1971).
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of process. 157 Such congressional power is still limited by fifth
amendment due process considerations. The real question is the
nature of that due process limitation when sovereign power is not
involved. In light of the functions suggested by the Woodson
Court, and the amplification of the underlying concerns develdevel
oped in Bauxites and Burger King, it is clear that a fairness compocompo
nent is an integral part of a due process analysis, which must be
satisfied even in the absence of any concern over sovereign
power. Granting that Congress is empowered to authorize nana
tionwide service of process, the case by case implementation of
that authority should still be limited by a due process requirement
of fairness to the defendant in the choice of the particular
forum. 15s
There are a number of arguments that may be made in oppo157. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
158. This application of a fairness standard based on the Bauxites analysis
was rejected by the district court in First Federal Savings & Loan v. Oppenheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 634 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court pointed out
that the author of Bauxites, Justice White, gave no indication of changing the
"legal landscape" in the area, and had indicated that there were no constituconstitu
tional restrictions on nationwide service in an earlier dissent. Id. at 1347. See
supra note 60. Moreover, the court relied heavily on Mariash and Fitzsimmons for
Fi
its view that a fairness analysis was inappropriate. 634 F. Supp. at 1347-48. Finally, the court felt that to adopt such a standard would make decisions difficult
because courts would be required to make a highly factbound analysis. !d. at
1348. As to whether the "legal landscape" has been changed, a full review of
the jurisdictional cases suggests this is a logical progression for the Court. See
supra text accompanying notes 110-50. This analysis also suggests the weakweak
nesses of l\1ariash and Fitzsimmons. In response to the argument that such a
factbound analysis will create problems, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court has clearly rejected this argument in jurisdictional cases. Shaffer v. HeitHeit
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977) (stating in response to argument that in rem jurisjuris
diction should not be subjected to inherently uncertain test of International Shoe
that fairness standard could be easily applied in most cases and in those cases
which were difficult Court was not prepared to sacrifice fairness for simplicity).
It is interesting to note that the Oppenheim court had no difficulty doing a fairness
analysis in a footnote. 634 F. Supp. at 1348 n.9.
It has been argued that a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to
authorize nationwide service of process is necessary because safeguards of a
Con
nonconstitutional nature, such as venue provisions, could be eliminated by Congress, and even if those provisions were not eliminated, defendants would be
disadvantaged because of the absence of the right of collateral attack, and the
difficulty of obtaining review and reversal of what are perceived as primarily disdis
Per
cretionary trial court decisions. Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide PersonalJurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1,36-37 (1984). It should
be noted, however, that even in the absence of venue provisions, courts could
provide some protection for defendants under principles of transfer and f01'llm
non conveniens. See infra text accompanying notes 169-78. It has been suggested
that in the context of an overall scheme to modernize venue and service of propro
cess in federal court, it would be appropriate to have a general provision for
nationwide service of process with venue provisions used to ensure a convenient
forum. Barett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Re-
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sition to this view. As the courts suggested in Briggs and Driver, it
might be argued that a fairness-due process analysis is relevant
only where the sovereign is attempting to assert power beyond its
inconborders.159 But, as argued above, this approach is logically incon
sistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in the analogous area of
state court jurisdiction. 160
A second argument was suggested by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzsimmons. 1G 1 The
court rejected the consideration of fairness as a constitutional re
restriction because it had always been "applied under the rubric of
forum non conveniens."162 In so stating, the court left open the
signifi
question whether the fairness factor had "constitutional significance."163 In using the term "forum non conveniens" the court pre
presumably intended to encompass all rhe aspects of venue which
seek to limit the choice of forum within the judicial system that
has adjudicatory power over the defendant.
This concept of federal venue as a means of allocating cases
operates in two ways: first, by statutes which arbitrarily denote a
number of locations in which a case may be heard. 164 Such provi
provisions are structured to allow for suit in certain arbitrarily defined
form, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 629 (1954); ALI STUDY, supra note 26, §§ 1314 (Fed(Fed
eral Question Jurisdiction), 217 (multi-party, multi-state diversity).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
160. Clermont, supra note Ill, at 439 n.132 ("[T]he tendency to ignore the
separate concept of forum-reasonableness explains the misleading statements
[that power is all that is relevant in this analysis] in the Stafford-type authorities
... and the Driver-type cases .... ") (citations omitted).
161. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
162. Id. at 334 n.5; accord FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255-58
(5th Cir. 1981). For a further discussion, see supra note 100. Decisions such as
these should be seriously questioned in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Bauxites. Thus, in Burstein v. State Bar of California, the court ques
questioned, without deciding, the continued vitality ofJim Walter when it stated that
"this court in Jim Walter Corp. suggested that the conceptual requirements of
both [fifth and fourteenth amendment] due process clauses were the same, albeit
relating to different sovereigns. If this is true, then the rationale of Jim Ira Iter
Corp. may have been undermined by Insurance Corp. of Ireland." 693 F.2d 511,
516 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982); Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (suggesting thatJim Walter was "seriously undermine[d]" by the Bauxites
decision); accord GRM v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307,
312-15 (S.D. Tex. 1984). In GRM, the court, however, cited some district court
opinions which have continued to apply a "national-contacts" test. 596 F. Supp.
at 314 n.9.
163. 589 F.2d at 334 n.5.
164. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (1982) (permits diversity action to be
brought in district where all plaintiffs reside, defendants reside, or claim arose).
Since such provisions are arbitrary they may allow for suit in a highly inconve
inconvenient place while not allowing it in a convenient one. Also the venue provisions
adopted in relation to nationwide service provisions are invariably drafted

HeinOnline -- 33 Vill. L. Rev. 35 1988

36

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 1

fora without regard to the convenience or fairness of those
choices in particular cases. Whether such a provision will be
helpful in avoiding an unfair choice of forum depends exclusively
on whether the particular statute is more or less restrictive in the
choices it permits. 165 For example, in cases under section
1391(e) the provision will do little to limit the plaintiff's choice
since she may always sue in the judicial district where she rere
lfi6
Even in cases where plaintiff's residence is not an acac
sides.
ceptable forum, the statutory choices may be broadened by
language such as that in the venue provision used in Mariash and
Fitzsimmons. Such provisions permit venue in any district where
"any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred"-a
provision which has been read broadly by the courtS. 167 On the
other hand, if a venue statute contains neither of these provisions,
but only permits suit where the defendant is an inhabitant, is
found or transacts business, it is more likely to ensure a fair and
convenient forum. 168 This is only to suggest that Congress may
avoid due process problems by carefully limiting venue in nationnation
wide service cases. It does not address the question whether due
process operates to set parameters for congressional action which
would become relevant when the plaintiff's forum of choice was
unreasonable in a particular case.
The second method of allocation operates by transfer proviprovi
sions which allow courts to move a suit from one district to anan
other for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of
justice. 169 As such, these provisions operate in a fashion analoanalo
gous to the common law concept offorum non conveniens. 170 If the
broadly to favor the plaintiff consistent with the purpose of the service proviprovi
sion. E.g., id. § 1391(d).
165. Fullerton, supra note 158, at 71-76.
166. That provision was the basis for venue in Driver, 74 F.R.D. at 400,
while venue in Briggs was based on another provision in 1391(e) which authorauthor
ized venue where any defendant had an official residence. 569 F.2d at 4-6.
167. For example, the Mariash court concluded that this provision was met
since the transfer agent had to be contacted in New York to remove the restricrestric
tive legend on the stock in order to complete the transaction which had nothing
to do with the reasonableness of the forum. 496 F.2d at 1143-45. Also a
number of courts have adopted a co-conspirator venue theory which grants
venue as to all defendants sued in a case involving a common scheme if anyone
defendant has acted within the forum district. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1985).
•
168. See Fullerton, supra note 158, at 74-76.
169. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982).
170. The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal court
system is only utilized in those rare cases where the more convenient forum is a
state court, or a court in a foreign country. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
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concept of a constitutional basis for a fairness analysis is accepted,
it may be less important whether such analysis is denominated
under a "rubric" of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens, I7I since
the resulting analysis should be the same. As a matter of strucstruc
ture, however, the maintenance of this standard under a jurisdicjurisdic
tional title would be superior. This is so because the
development of concepts such as forum non conveniens and transfer
were intended to limit a jurisdictional system which focused on
physical power over the defendant, rather than intended as methmeth
ods of finding a fair forum for the litigation. 172 It would be more
appropriate to structure a jurisdictional analysis to deal with the
affirmative responsibility to provide a constitutionally fair forum; .
and as a consequence to de-emphasize these other analyses which
dis
historically have not had a constitutional basis, leaving wide discretion in the trial court. 173
Those who support the predominance of the concept of
transfer in this area have further argued that, wh~le a constituconstitu
tional fairness doctrine does exist, it is unnecessary to consider
because all the problems it would address are handled by subconsubcon
stitutional concepts such as transfer. As one court has stated:
Some commentators have suggested that the due propro
cess clause of the fifth amendment imposes upon the
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts restrictions
similar to those imposed on state courts under the fourfour
teenth amendment. . . . As this court has observed,
"[a]lthough the propriety of service issuing from a fedfed
eral court need not necessarily be tested by the same
yardstick as is the constitutional limitation upon service
of process from a state court, the latter standard propro
vides a helpful and often used guideline." ... Strict fedfed
eral venue requirements, however, have made it
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (1976). An example of this
limited use of/orum non conveniens in federal court is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.
454 U.S. 235 (1981). In Reyno the Supreme Court pointed out that transfer is
more than a mere codification of/orum 1/011 conveniells, but is instead a revision
which gives greater discretion to the court to transfer since it would not involve
a dismissal. Id. at 253.
defend
171. One problem raised by the choice of title is that historically defendants have had greater freedom to collaterally attack a default judgment for lack
of personal jurisdiction, but not for lack of venue. Currie, The Federal Courts aud
the American Law Institute. Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268. 303-04 & n.430 (1969);
Fullerton, supm note 158. at 36-37.
172. Ehrenzweig, supm note 154, at 305-09.
173. See id. at 312.
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unnecessary to develop ajudicial doctrine of the limits of
personal jurisdiction in federal cases. Thus, as a practipracti
cal matter, the most significant restraint on the personal
jurisdiction of federal courts in federal cases is service of
process .... 174
There are several reasons why it would be unwise to follow
this approach. The purpose of a constitutional limitation on juju
risdiction is to serve as a floor which limits Congress' legislative
use of venue and the discretionary right of courts to change
venue. 175 In the same way that fairness serves as a constitutional
limit on assertions of jurisdiction by state courts, it should serve
as a limit on the federal system's use of process and venue. In
addition, by only addressing the subconstitutional issue of venue,
such an analysis encourages arbitrary line drawing between jurisjuris
diction and venue. These arbitrary distinctions, in turn, lead
courts to erroneously view jurisdiction as exclusively a question of
"power" and venue as the sole basis behind considerations of
fairness. 176 The development of a due process analysis in the
state-court jurisdiction cases has shown the increasing interdeinterde
pendency of power and fairness as analytic tools. 177 This should
be encouraged by a more unified jurisdictional approach which
"fair
recognizes this interdependency. Finally, to focus on the "fairness" as the domain of a subconstitutional venue analysis is to dede
emphasize an issue of central significance which would be best
174. Terry v. Raymond InCI, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit subsequently overruled Teny on other
grounds. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 427 (5th
Cir. 1986) (overruled only to extent that it held no specific congressional auau
thorization was necessary to assert jurisdiction).
175. See Clermont, supra note Ill, at 437-41. Professor Clermont has sugsug
'gested a "reformulation" of jurisdictional analysis which recognizes the consticonsti
tutional concept of fairness under the title of "forum-reasonableness."
I 76. A better way of distinguishing jurisdiction and venue is based on the
view that
jurisdiction is relatively more concerned with fairness and venue more
with inconvenience. If the two concepts should be described as applyapply
ing along a continuum, one extreme might be demonstrated by the case
in which the corporate defendant's contacts with the forum were so
minimal that it would be patently unfair, let alone inconvenient, to rere
quire him to defend an action there. Due Process would say that the
forum lacked jurisdiction .... At the other extreme would be the case
in which not only were jurisdiction and venue proper, but the inconveninconven
ience caused the corporation by requiring it to defend the suit where
brought would be so slight that a motion for discretionary transfer ...
would be denied.
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (citations omitted).
177. See JIIj)l'a text accompanying notes 110-50.
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confronted head-on by courts. 178
In addressing these arguments It IS important to recall that
there may be situations in which problems of convenience and
fairness can be solved by venue provisions, but because such tools
are available does not mean that a constitutional due process
standard cannot continue to operate as a limiting standard of juju
dicial control. To conclude otherwise would be illogical in light
of the Supreme Court's efforts to clarify the underlying concerns
of due process in the state court area. This point was made clear
by Justice Brennan in Burger King, where he emphasized that even
if a defendant had sufficient forum activities to warrant an asser- .
tion of jurisdiction, other fairness factors might warrant a denial
of jurisdiction. Justice Brennan went on to point out that many of
those considerations could be dealt with "through means short of
finding jurisdiction unconstitutional." 179 This did not lead to the
conclusion that a constitutional standard was unnecessary, but
rather, that "[m]inimum requirements inherent in the concept of
'fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in fofo
rum activities."18o The clear import of the Court's reasoning is
that while venue and transfer provisions may avoid many
problems before they reach constitutional proportions, the due
process clause continues to be present and to operate as a minimini
mum standard of fairness to protect defendants from being unun
fairly treated.
178. See s'Jpra notes 158 and 171. Thus in a case such as Briggs it is possible
that the trial court would quickly dispose of the transfer question because it felt
that if it had jurisdiction because it had "power," it need not be concerned with
the exercise of discretionary power based on convenience. See supm note 44.
The Court of Appeals in Driver did raise the possibility of transfer, which was not
mentioned in the district court's opinion. The Court of Appeals stated that it
would expect courts to be sympathetic to motions for change of venue
when defendants would otherwise be substantially prejudiced and when
there is an alternative venue that would protect parties' rights. FurtherFurther
more, we note that officers of the federal government are different from
private defendants because they can anticipate that their official acts
may affect people in every part of the United States.
577 F.2d at 157. While the court's suggestion that change of venue be given
serious consideration is important, the fact that it was little considered in Dril'PJ'
and Briggs gives support to the view that the discretionary nature and history of
transfer leave substantial risks for defendants which can only be protected with a
constitutional due process minimum requirement. Courts are simply lOO willing
to exercise their discretion to allow the plaintiff's choice without careful analysis.
See Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 334 n.6.
179. 471 U.S. at 477.
180. [d.; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033-35
(1987).
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Fair Forum Standard

If such an approach is correct, then it is clear that due propro
cess does require a fair forum for the defendant. The question
remains, however, what standards are relevant to this determinadetermina
tion of fairness. It is not possible to simply use the tests which the
Supreme Court has developed in the state jurisdictional cases. In
setting up that ,flexible concept,181 the Court was concerned
about the question of a fair forum and the sovereign power of the
state. 182 Therefore it focused on "the relationship among the dede
fendant, the forum, and the litigation" in determining the approappro
priateness of an assertion of jurisdiction. 183 However, federal
courts would only be concerned with the fair forum function in
establishing standards in nationwide service of process cases. In
light of this and the congressional purpose of providing a conveconve
nient forum for the plaintiff in these cases, less emphasis need be
placed on the defendant, since there is no justification for favorfavor
ing one party over the other. 184 Rather, it would be appropriate
for a court to make its determination by looking more broadly at
both parties, the transaction which underlies the lawsuit, the nana
ture of the litigation and the relationship of these factors to the
chosen forum.18s This analysis is appropriate in the context of
situations where the fair allocation of cases within the federal
court system is of concern, rather than the power to require the
defendant to appear. 186
181. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
182. See, e.g., Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292-94.
183. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
184. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 154, at 1127-28.
185. This approach led Justice Black to dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), and state his view of what was relevant to deciding whether a
defendant could be required to appear in a particular state's forum.
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship to a
State as Mrs. Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to
have power to adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction,
unless litigation there would impose such a heavy and disproportionate
burden on a nonresident that it would offend what this Court has rere
ferred to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 258-59 (Black, j., dissenting). Fullerton has sugg'ested a more defendantdefendant
focused approach, which would analyze the inconvenience to the defendant and
whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated litigation in the fofo
rum, along with government interests in litigating in a particular place in deciddecid
ing whether the assertion of jurisdiction is proper. Fullerton, wpm note 158, at
38-60.
186. It has been suggested that this analysis is appropriate even when the
case involves state court jurisdiction. E.g., Hazard, supm note 110, at 281; SilSil
berman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Elld of (/11 Em, 53 N.V.U.L. RE\,. 33, 79-90
(1978). Bul see Louis, supm note 139, at 408-09, 423-25.
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JusThis approach was suggested and embellished upon by Jus
tice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Shaffer v.
Heitner. 187 In Shaffer (a state court jurisdiction case) he argued
that the due process analysis was "closely related" to the analysis
of choice of laws because
[i]n either case an important linchpin is the extent of
contacts between the controversy, the parties, and the
forum State .... [I]mportant considerations certainly in
include the expectancies of the parties and the fairness of
governing the defendants' acts and behavior by rules of
conduct created by a given jurisdiction. . .. [T]he decideci
sion that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws
and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fair
fairness of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction
for adjudicating the controversy.188
While we are not concerned with choice of law here, those same
basic factors seem most relevant to any fairness analysis.
A similar note was sounded in Woodson, where the Court set
forth elements, in addition to the burden on the defendant, which
it thought were relevant to the fairness question. These factors
included:
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, ...
effecthe plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effec
tive relief ... at least when that interest is not adequately
protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum,
... the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
fundashared interest of the several States in furthering funda
mental substantive social policies .... 189
Putting aside any particular state's interest, and substituting for it
the interest of the federal government, these opinions support an
analysis which focuses on the plaintiff's and defendant's desire to
litigate in a particular forum and the government's concern that
special protection be given to certain classes of plaintiffs, but
which at the same time allows for an economical resolution of dis187. 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, j., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
188. Id. at 225; see also Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299-301 (Brennan, j.,
dissenting) .
189. lI'oodson, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted).
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putes. Weighing these elements, a court would decide whether it
was warranted in requiring a defendant to appear.
A comparable formula was suggested in Oxford First Corp. v.
PNC Liquidating Corp., 190 in which the district court attempted to
place some fifth amendment fairness limits on nationwide service
of process in a suit under the Securities Exchange Act. The facfac
tors which the Oxford court considered relevant to its decision
were (1) the extent of the defendant's contacts with the district in
which the action was brought; (2) the inconvenience to the dede
fendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction other than the place
of his residence; (3) judicial economy; (4) the probable situs of
discovery; and (5) the nature of the regulated activity and its imim
pact outside defendant's state of residence or business. 191 These
factors are certainly helpful. However, as has already been noted,
once fairness to litigate in a particular place is accepted as the
basis of this analysis, rather than the power to require the defenddefend
ant to appear, it would be proper to eliminate those factors which
focus exclusively on the needs and burdens placed on the defenddefend
ant, and substitute a balancing of the interests of both parties and
the sovereign in efficiently disposing of the case. 192 Once this is
done it would be possihle to focus on the underlying transaction,
the litigation and the interests of all those involved in determindetermin
ing whether the litigation is in a constitutionally adequate forum
for due process purposes.
Thus, a court should consider a variety of factors in deterdeter
mining whether an assertion of jurisdiction under a nationwide
service of process provision should require a person to defend in
190. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.O. Pa. 1974). As indicated earlier, this opinion
was criticized in Fitzsimmons on the view that a fairness test was not appropriate
in these circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. Contra Smith
v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 674 F. Supp. 542, 544 (W.O. W. Va. 1987) (following
Oxford First because it "recognizes the underlying rationale of fundamental fairfair
ness to restrictions on jurisdiction").
191. 372 F. Supp. at 203-04.
192. Thus, in GRlI1 v. Equine Investment & Management Gro liP , the district
court cited Oxford First with approval, but in setting forth its fairness test the
court made a subtle shift towards a more balanced consideration of fairness.
596 F. Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1984). Its factors were:
(1) the. burden imposed upon the defendants by Texas litigation,
(2) defendants' reasonable expectations and the foreseeability of Texas
litigation, (3) plaintiffs' interest in convenient and effective relief,
(4) the federal judicial system's interest in efficiently resolving controcontro
versies, and (5) Texas's interest in having a court in Texas adjudicate
this dispute.
!d. at 315. In a footnote the court suggested that the five factors could be sumsum
marized as weighing "the relative equities and convenience between parties."
Id. at 315 n.12.
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a particular district court. One such factor would be where the
events took place and whether the witnesses and various types of
evidence would be available in the chosen forum. On a practical
level it would be highly inefficient to allow a case to be conducted
in a court which cannot conveniently hear it. 193
A second factor is the relative convenience of the plaintiff
and the defendant, and their reasonable expectations in litigating
in the chosen forum. Of particular significance is whether either
party's activities are so localized, or conversely, so pervasively
cho
multistate, as to warrant allowing the case to be heard in the cho194
sen forum.
Given the nature of the parties and the location of
the forum where the plaintiff instituted suit, it may be the case
that litigating in the chosen forum would not be unreasonable for
the defendant, whereas requiring the plaintiff to travel to the dede
fendant's residence might be. For example, if the plaintiff was an
individual residing in the forum, and the defendant was a corpocorpo
ration whose business reasonably lead it to expect suits in other
districts, the court would be acting properly in giving substantial
weight to the plaintiff's choice. This would be particularly true if
the defendant's ·multistate activities aggressively impinged on a
plaintiff whose activities were local to the chosen forum. 195 Even
though the defendant's aggressiveness was not sufficient to satisfy
a state court minimum contacts test, it might be sufficient under a
more flexible analysis that was concerned only with the fairness of
the forum and not with the sovereign power of the court involved.
Finally, it would be important for the court to weigh its own
pro
interest, and that of the parties, in resolving the case in one proceeding. This would be particularly important in cases where the
other fairness factors were not dispositive. For example, in a case
involving multiple districts and multiple plaintiffs or defendants,
various interests could lead to a situation where different fora
would be fairest depending on the point of view considered. At
this juncture the court should have some flexibility to decide
whether the plaintiff's choice was reasonable, and if so, whether
to hear the entire case in that one location. 1!)(}
193. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal.3d 143, 150-51,545 P.2d 264, 26869, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356-57 (1976).
194. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 154, at 1168.
195. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal jurisdiction .·lfter Shaffer and
Kulko and a .\fodest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. WoodWood
son, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 891-92 (1978).
196. See. f.g .• Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 893, 458
P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). This legitimate policy concern is also the
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If the interests of the parties were in equipoise, then the
court should resolve the dispute in favor of the plaintiff's choice,
since there would be an absence of unjustified unfairness to the
defendant. Given the absence, the congressional purpose evievi
denced in the particular statute of favoring the plaintiff's choice
of forum, should be upheld.
The factors suggested here are not intended as an exclusive
list but rather as an open ended series of suggestions informing
the type of factual questions necessary to consider in determining
the fairness under the due process clause of requiring litigation to
be conducted in a particular court. Even if these standards are
used by the courts, it does not necessarily mean that the result in
any particular case will be different than it has been in the past.
But in making its decision, a court will be applying an appropriate
standard to determine the parties' rights.
Particularly in some areas, such as cases under the InterInter
pleader Act, it has already been suggested earlier in this article l97
that courts should weigh heavily the plaintiff's need for a single
forum for resolution of the dispute. It would be unfair to the
plaintiff in those circumstances to decline jurisdiction over all of
the defendants in any reasonably chosen forum. Thus the interinter
ests of the plaintiff and the judicial system in a single adjudication
would outweigh the interests of any particular defendant. 198
In other areas, however, more emphasis may be placed on
some of the other factors mentioned. Of special importance may
be the relative convenience of obtaining discovery and evidence,
as well as the district court's familiarity with the locale in which
the transaction took place. Also the relative interests of the plainplain
impor
tiff and defendant in having a convenient forum may be important, especially as this relates to those who have aggressively
pursued or imposed themselves on others. Thus, in a case such
as Mariash 199 the facts indicated that the plaintiff was contacted in
New York and the various opinion letters were sent to New York
incor
even though the corporation whose stock was involved was incorporated in Massachusetts and the defendant-attorneys resided in
basis for the broad application of venue provisions which courts have used
under a co-conspirator venue theory. See supra note 167.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
198. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 346-48, 316 P.2d 960, 96566 (1957), appeal dismissed and mi. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
199. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). For a further discussion see supra text
accompanying notes 77-89.
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Massachusetts. 2oo Also many of the nonparty witnesses were in
New York. 201 Given the multistate nature of the defendants' acac
tivities and the fact that so much of the underlying transaction
occurred in New York, it would be reasonable to require the atat
torney-defendants to appear there, even if they did not have the
requisite contacts to satisfy a state jurisdiction minimum contacts
test. 202
In Fitzsimmons,203 the defendant, Barton, who challenged juju
risdiction, had made several trips to the chosen forum. These
trips were apparently not so directly related to the fraudulent acac
tivity as to satisfy the Illinois long-arm statute, which the district
court had erroneously assumed applied. 204 Since the court of apap
peals concluded that the assertion of jurisdiction did not require a
fairness analysis, it chose not to develop the facts necessary to
make a firm analysis in this case. However, the opinion suggests
that the other defendants in the lawsuit were subject to jurisdicjurisdic
tion in the forum since they chose not to challenge on personal
jurisdiction grounds. 205 Beyond this, the nature of Barton's trips
indicate multistate activities 206 which should have reasonably led
200.496 F.2d at 1140-41.
201. [d. This would include the plaintiff's broker, independent legal councoun
sel hired to give an opinion letter and the corporation's transfer agent. [d. at
1141. Also the other defendants presumably had substantial relations with New
York since they chose not to challenge the assertion ofjurisdiction, although this
is never specifically discussed in the opinion. If the court had required the analanal
ysis which is suggested in this article, it presumably would have required more
discovery, instead of relying on the "barest skeleton of a record" as it did here.
[d. at 1140.
202. The district court had in fact dismissed the defendant-attorneys on the
erroneous assumption that the New York long-arm statute applied and that
these defendants were not subject to jurisdiction under it. [d. at 1142.
203. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). For a further discusision, see supra text
accompanying notes 90-100.
execu
204. 589 F.2d at 331-32. Defendant Barton was president and chief execupri
tive officer of United Founders Life Insurance Company whose business was primarily generated by the Teamsters' Pension Fund, whose Trustees were the
plaintiffs in this action. He was also a director and officer of Reis Corporation
which was a creditor of United Founders. In turn Reis was indebted to the PenPen
sion Fund. The Pension Fund considered the possibility of self-insuring, and
this created the possibility that United Founders would not be able to pay Reis,
and Reis would then be unable to pay the Pension Fund. Ultimately the Pension
Fund did not self-insure, but it did alter the terms of its insurance. This led to a
need to restructure the Reis indebtedness to the Pension Fund. It was during
this restructuring that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations took place.
The district court felt that Barton's trips to Illinois did not constitute sufficient
contacts with Illinois because it was satisfied that those trips related to self-insurself-insur
ance plans and not to the debt restructuring. [d.
205. See id. at 331.
206. !d. at 334 n.6.
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him to expect to be subject to suit in a forum such as that chosen
by the plaintiffs. If, in addition, a sufficient portion of the transactransac
tion underlying the lawsuit occurred in the forum,207 then it
would clearly be reasonable to require the defendant to appear
there.
Cases such as Briggs 208 and Driver 209 may require a somewhat
different conclusion. In Briggs all of the events relating to the
grand jury proceeding took place in Florida and three of the four
defendants apparently resided there. 210 The plaintiffs were called
to testify in Florida and resided in a number of different states,
but none resided in the District of Columbia where the suit was
brought. 211 The only connection the case had with the District of
Columbia was that the fourth defendant had his official residence
there. 212 In these circumstances it would be inconsistent with due
process to require the Florida defendants to appear in the District
of Columbia. The events took place in Florida, three of the dede
fendants resided there and the alleged improper activity of all the
defendants occurred there. In addition, the plaintiffs' residences
would not indicate any compelling reason for litigating in the DisDis
trict of Columbia. Under these circumstances due process should
require that the suit be brought in Florida with the nationwide
207. The court specifically left open whether any of the defendant's arguargu
ments might be relevant to the question of proper venue in the district since
oc
section 27 requires an act or transaction constituting the violation to have occurred in the district. [d. at 334-35 & n. 7.
208. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds
. sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). See supra text accompanying
notes 42-48. One aspect of suits under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
may place cases such as Briggs and Driver in a special category. Since the
Supreme Court ruled that defendants were not subject to damages under the
Act, the result is that in most cases officers will only be sued for mandamus while
Attor
they are in office. See 444 U.S. at 543-44. As such the local United States Attorlitiga
ney's Office and the Justice Department will bear most of the burdens of litigation, and the officer will only rarely have to appear and, then, at government
expense. /d. The realities of this type of case will presumably tip the balance in
plaintiff's favor in most instances, while not changing the fact that the balancing
must be done.
209. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 147 (1st
Cir. 1978), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
For a further discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 49-58. For a special
caveat in this type of case, see supra note 208.
210. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980)
(No. 77-1546).
211. Six of the plaintiffs resided in Florida, two in Texas, one in Delaware
and one in New York. [d. at 4.
re
212. 444 U.S. at 532. This defendant joined the other defendants in requesting the case be transferred to the Northern District of Florida. /d. at 531
n.2.
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service provision being used to require the District of Columbia
defendant to appear in the appropriate federal court located in
that state.
In Driver the basis for bringing the class action in Rhode IsIs
land Federal District Court was that it was the residence of one of
the representative plaintiffs. 213 All of the alleged improper interinter
ference with the plaintiffs' mail occurred in New York City.214
Consequently, the defendants could argue that there was no rearea
sonable basis for this case to be heard in Rhode Island. However,
the plaintiffs might respond that the defendants' interference with
their mail constituted multistate activity which had an impact in
the locale where the letters were mailed. As a result, the defenddefend
ants should reasonably expect to litigate these questions where
their actions had an impact. Since Rhode Island was apparently
such a place,215 great weight should be given to the plaintiffs'
choice of forum. This should be especially so, if the defendants
failed to show any particular burdens on them. Relevant to this
latter question would be whether there would be any discovery or
trial problems raised by a Rhode Island forum. This would apap
pear to be the most difficult case of the group for the court to
make a determination. However, in light of the congressional
presumption in favor of plaintiffs' choice of forum, it would seem
that a strong argument could be made for allowing the case to
continue in Rhode Island.
In all of these cases, it might be necessary for the court to
allow the parties preliminary discovery to ascertain additional
facts. This was apparently not done in these cases because of the
limited standards of fifth amendment due process which the
courts felt obliged to use. Once the appropriate information is
before the court it could make a careful review of all the factual
permutations in the particular situation in deciding whether to
dismiss or transfer the action. 216 Such a determination would not
be made based upon a wooden analysis of whether there was ade213. The other plaintiffs who represented the class were residents of New
York, Minnesota. Connecticut and California. 577 F.2d at 149 n.2.
214. ld. at 149 n.3.
215. Driver, 74 F.R.D. at 400 n.23.
216. It is clear that in the absence of personal jurisdiction. a federal court
has the option to transfer the case in the interests of justice to a district that can
properly assert jurisdiction. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman. 369 U.S. 463, 466-67
PROCE
(1962); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3827, at 171 (1976); Comment, Change of Venue in Absence of PersonalJurisPersonalJuris
diction Under 28 U.S.c. 1404(a) and 1406(a), 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 735 (1963).
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quate notice, but rather on a more supple consideration of all the
components relevant to due process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, Congress has the power to authorize nana
tionwide service of process, but that power should be limited by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In establishing
the. restrictions on this congressional power, the courts have
failed to establish meaningful due process requirements. ConsisConsis
tent with what the Supreme Court has established as the functions
of a due process analysis in state-court jurisdiction cases, it is
clear that this congressional power should be limited by a case by
case analysis of the fairness of a forum to hear a particular matter.
Such an analysis will require a careful review of the relations of
the plaintiff, defendant and the transaction involved in the litigalitiga
tion in order to ensure that the defendant receives the protection
to which he is entitled under the Constitution.
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